From Davos to Dubai, Gulf States Outcompete Switzerland for Trade and Influence
From 'Dubai chocolate' to 'Davos in the desert', Switzerland is being outcompeted by the strategically agile Gulf states for economic and diplomatic influence
Sweet Treats, Sour Politics
In late 2024, “Dubai chocolate”, a Middle Eastern chocolate brand founded in Dubai, became a global trend via TikTok, a Chinese-owned social media platform. Dubai chocolates’ diabetic portion sizes, exotic packaging, and social media campaigns promote the aspiration of abundant consumption that has become a hallmark of the newly-monied but precariously placed middle classes produced by economic globalisation in the “global south”. Yet Dubai chocolate’s popularity was not restricted to Dubai alone, the Arab Gulf, or even the global south; in Europe, queues formed to get a taste of the product, and furore ensued over what has been deemed as a ‘gluttonous assault on the more refined European palate.’
In Switzerland, Dubai chocolate became the subject of national ire. The Swiss chocolate industry, boasting centuries of excellence and iconic companies such as Lindt, Toblerone and Cailler, has long dominated the world market. Provoked by what was viewed as unprecedented competition to what was otherwise a safe Swiss speciality, Switzerland has responded to Dubai chocolate with a degree of protectionism. Swiss distributors have voluntarily restricted access to Dubai chocolate by rationing stocks and creating long queues at points of sale. A scientific study was commissioned, concluding alleged hygiene shortcomings in certain production chains and harmful health effects in the absence of clear standards, leading to supermarket chains like Spar, in Switzerland, withdrawing Dubai chocolate from their shelves. The Swiss press launched a media offensive, describing Dubai chocolate as “stupid” and “in bad taste,” even claiming that consumers of this chocolate had “the palate of a COVID-infected Doberman.” Some Swiss editors went as far as claiming that this was a deliberate soft-power operation by the UAE. Where some saw competition, others saw opportunity. The famed Swiss chocolate manufacturer Lindt decided to ride the viral coattails of Dubai chocolate and launched a similarly inspired range of products, initially intended for the German market, then quickly extended to Switzerland and the rest of Europe.
What could otherwise be seen as a quirk of the times is merely the latest salvo in an increasingly consequential competition for trade, diplomacy, and cultural soft power between Switzerland and the Gulf states like Saudi Arabia (KSA), the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Qatar. For decades, Switzerland has leveraged its official stance of political neutrality, privacy laws, and financial acumen to become the preferred global centre for cross-border wealth management and diplomacy.
As the Gulf states reaped the windfall from their newfound energy resources in the 20th century, Switzerland was one of the main beneficiaries, with its private banks and wealth-management activities attracting capital from the Gulf, whose states have long been content as mere clients of Switzerland’s services. However, the rise of a new generation of rulers in the Gulf states, driven by the desire to diversify their economies beyond hydrocarbon rents, have identified and leapt on an opportunity to reverse this relationship.
Buoyed by huge capital war chests from their energy resources, and the reversion to the historical mean of the locus of global trade and geopolitics from the Atlantic to the Indo-Pacific, the Gulf states are displacing Switzerland as a centre for trade and diplomacy. They have created their own financial centres in cities like Dubai, Riyadh, and Bahrain, whose institutions now directly compete with Swiss banks in asset management, the structuring of alternative investments, and the financing of international projects. The Gulf states have done so by building competitive regulatory frameworks and tax regimes for business and investment, are investing in advanced technologies and infrastructure, and are positioning themselves as neutral diplomatic intermediaries in global diplomacy.
The War for Wealth Management
Switzerland has enjoyed an unrivalled reputation in the world of finance for centuries, with a robust banking sector, favourable taxation and exceptional wealth-management expertise. Swiss cities like Geneva, Zurich and Zug are global centres of finance that symbolise discretion, security and know-how, attracting capital from around the globe. Yet several recent events have undermined this model, opening the door to competition from the Gulf states.
The first blow to Switzerland came with the end of banking secrecy. Under pressure from the United States, which in 2014 enacted FATCA (the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act), and then from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Switzerland was forced to accept the automatic exchange of fiscal information. Swiss banks, traditionally guarantors of their clients’ anonymity, found themselves obliged to disclose the identities of foreign account holders. While this reform was a boon for the fight against tax evasion, it nonetheless eroded one of the pillars of the Swiss financial centre’s appeal: secrecy.
Meanwhile, the Gulf financial centres protected themselves from the same obligations. Through intensive lobbying of American and European authorities in Washington and Brussels, Dubai, Abu Dhabi, and Doha secured exemptions that allow them to maintain highly advantageous tax and confidentiality regimes. Dubai, in particular, has established itself as a prime destination for the ultra-wealthy seeking discretion and returns, capturing an ever-larger share of the capital flows long directed to Switzerland.
The Credit Suisse crisis, one of the main pillars of Swiss finance, was a significant shift in the competitive landscape for global finance. Since 2018, the Saudi National Bank (SNB), a subsidiary of the Public Investment Fund, has held a significant stake in Credit Suisse. When the share price plunged severely in 2023, SNB wanted to increase its holding to 40% to support the bank. Swiss regulators, fearing excessive interference by a foreign actor and keen to preserve national financial sovereignty, vehemently opposed the move, citing regulatory concerns.
The counter-strike was swift. In a sensational statement, SNB’s CEO, Ammar Al-Khudairy, announced that he would not inject further capital nor intervene to bail out Credit Suisse, citing “regulatory reasons.” This announcement triggered market panic: the stock price collapsed, sending investor confidence into a negative spiral. Confronted with the risk of a systemic banking collapse that could have destabilised the entire Swiss financial system, the authorities urgently orchestrated the merger of Credit Suisse with UBS, the other Swiss banking giant. This emergency takeover marked a turning point: to protect its model, Switzerland had to sacrifice a historic institution. In this crisis, Gulf banks like SNB demonstrated their newfound status as formidable challengers capable of imperilling Europe’s century-old institutions of finance.
Gulf cities now boast spectacular expansion rates and incoming capital flows: Dubai has multiplied its assets under management by capitalising on the rise of investments and the relocation of wealthy families. Middle Eastern families will also undergo a generational wealth transfer of approximately $1 trillion by 2030. Aware of this opportunity, private banks have launched the development of innovative fintech platforms: robo-advisors, digital wealth-tracking portals, asset-tokenisation solutions and app-based managed portfolios. This has prompted major Swiss banks like Lombard Odier, Pictet and Julius Baer to strengthen their presence in the region by opening new offices and hiring on-site specialist advisers. While headcount in Switzerland is slowing and undergoing restructuring, its Gulf branches are in the midst of a recruitment drive.
The Gulf states have made fintech a major pillar of their national economic diversification strategy. In the UAE, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia, governments have enacted laws and set up dedicated regulatory regimes to lure startups, investors and talent. Cities like Dubai aspire to become a premier financial and entrepreneurial hub, rivalling London and New York. It seems to be working. Fintech entrepreneurs and investors, especially in digital assets, like Changpeng Zhao, founder of Binance, obtained Emirati nationality and moved part of his operations to Dubai to benefit from a favourable legal and fiscal framework. Meanwhile, the founder of Bitcoin Suisse is considering relocating his entire company’s activities to Abu Dhabi to take advantage of the region’s regulatory climate and available capital pool.
The Gulf has transformed from exporters of capital via sovereign wealth funds into investment destinations and now attracts massive flows. Abu Dhabi has become a preferred destination for hedge funds, hosting 140 funds at the Abu Dhabi Global Market and 75 at the Dubai International Financial Centre, whereas Switzerland counted roughly 200 as late as 2016. This month, Goldman Sachs convened an ultra-exclusive gathering of just 100 invitees in Abu Dhabi; among them Ken Griffin of Citadel, Paul Singer of Elliott Management, Paul Marshall of Marshall Wace and former CIA Director General David Petraeus, now a partner at KKR. Jared Cohen, President of Global Affairs at Goldman Sachs, told Bloomberg, “In the case of the UAE, they remain the preferred location for international business to headquarter and the place where people find most attractive to live in the region.”
The Competition for Commodities and International Trade
The fiercest competition between Switzerland and the Gulf states is playing out in the arena of international trade, where each seeks to become the indispensable hub for commodity flows. Geneva, renowned for centuries as the trading capital, hosts a complete ecosystem: banks specialising in trade finance (UBS, Crédit Suisse, Pictet), leading logistics providers (MSC), a stable regulatory framework and advantageous taxation. Zug has also established itself as a tax haven for hedge funds, offering discretion, flexibility and low tax rates.
Far from the shores of Lake Geneva, the Gulf states have launched a genuine financial offensive as part of their strategy for food and energy sovereignty, and Swiss institutions are a key target. In 2021, Abu Dhabi’s sovereign wealth fund (ADQ) took a 45% stake in the Dutch–Swiss Louis Dreyfus Company, one of the giants of agricultural trading, injecting several billion dollars to consolidate its position in the global grains and oilseeds markets. Meanwhile, Qatar, through its sovereign wealth fund, the Qatar Investment Authority (QIA), now holds 9% of Glencore, the world leader in the trading of ores, oil and metals. These strategic stakes give the Gulf states direct leverage to influence prices and secure their supplies amid increased volatility.
Among all the Gulf states and cities, Dubai has done the most to capitalise on its geographic position at the nexus of the African, European and Asian continents, to capture capital flows between all three continents. Dubai has also established itself as a stronghold of commodity trading. The Dubai Multi Commodities Centre (DMCC), a free zone launched in 2002, now attracts over 20,000 trading companies, compared to Switzerland, which hosts only 900 companies in this sector. Full exemption from income tax, absence of customs duties and ultra-rapid company-formation procedures explain the massive exodus of traders originally based in London or Geneva. In 2023, during a visit to Switzerland, the President of DMCC announced that over the past two years, Swiss company registrations with DMCC have surged by 30%, bringing the total to 400 Swiss firms operating within Dubai’s free zone.
In the gold market, Switzerland remains the world’s leading refiner: nearly 30% of global production passes through its refineries each year, with historic players such as PAMP, Valcambi and Metalor. But the UAE is no longer content to act merely as an intermediary: they are investing in their own refineries. Kaloti, one of the largest Emirati refiners, exports most of its production to Switzerland. In 2020, a report by the NGO Swissaid denounced the dubious origin of certain gold sources, pointing to gold mined in conflict zones in Sudan. Valcambi, accused of merely relaying these volumes, faced pressure from the Swiss Association of Precious Metals Manufacturers and Traders to suspend all Emirati imports. Rather than comply, the Ticino-based company withdrew from the association in 2023, preferring to defend itself in court. Faced with the controversy, Abu Dhabi authorities ultimately decided to shut several non-compliant refineries and strengthen export controls, hoping to cleanse their image and sustain their strategy of industrialising the gold sector.
The rivalry also extends to the maritime domain. DP World, the Dubai-based maritime logistics company, now operates over 60 ports and terminals worldwide, from Rotterdam to Melbourne. This Emirati giant is a pillar of the global logistics chain, thanks to state-of-the-art terminals and vertical integration of handling services that include end-to-end logistics and supply-chain services like cargo handling, freight-forwarding, contract logistics and port & terminal operations, across its global network. It also provides marine services, economic free-zone management and digital trade-solution platforms to streamline international trade flows
In response, Switzerland has increasingly relied on the world leader in maritime transport, Mediterranean Shipping Company (MSC), owned by the Aponte family and headquartered in Geneva. MSC, while a client and partner of DP World in container shipping, also competes directly via its Terminal Investment Limited (TIL Group) subsidiary, and TIL and DP World are locked in a fierce battle for port and terminal concessions and management, particularly across Africa. In partnership with BlackRock, MSC finalised a $23 billion mega-acquisition of Hong Kong’s CK Hutchison’s port assets. Beyond the Panama Canal, MSC will take over the management of more than 40 ports, including twelve in the Middle East: Sohar (Oman), handling 80% of national cargo, Basra (Iraq), Alexandria and El Dekheila (Egypt), Jazan (Saudi Arabia), as well as Ajman and Ras al Khaimah (UAE). This operation aims to redirect one-fifth of global maritime traffic to MSC terminals, depriving DP World of a significant share of its business volume.
The battle for international trade reflects a major geopolitical shift in which the centre of the global economy is gradually moving from the Atlantic to the Indo-Pacific. Long regarded as the “safe place” at the heart of Europe for capital, this shift is displacing Switzerland’s traditional role as it is no longer at the heart of world events. With over 3 billion people living along the Istanbul–Jakarta axis (excluding China), this swathe of Asia represents a rapidly expanding market. It is in this context that Dubai has risen to become the region’s premier financial centre in MEASA region (Middle East, Africa, Southeast Asia), thanks to its hub, the Dubai International Financial Centre (DIFC).
With greater financial firepower and burgeoning influence over trade flows, the Gulf states are also interested in leveraging their geopolitical position and the shifting of the global economy to centre themselves as diplomatic intermediaries.
Davos Moves to the Desert
Switzerland, long perceived as a neutral state and a leading mediator in diplomatic affairs, also hosts the headquarters of numerous international organisations and enjoys an image as a country that fosters global dialogue. However, in recent years, its role as arbitrator and diplomatic influencer has yielded ground to the Gulf states, which are multiplying mediation initiatives and strengthening their soft power on the international stage.
Where the Gulf states market themselves as neutral diplomatic intermediaries in geopolitics, Switzerland’s status as a neutral nation, one maintained for centuries as a pillar of its statecraft, has become compromised. When Bern imposed, in alignment with the European Union, a series of sanctions on Russia, Dubai saw operators flock to continue trading Russian oil, gas and gold. The city-state quickly became the preferred platform for these transactions, thanks to a flexible interpretation of international regulations and minimal checks on cargo origins. This situation boosted its attractiveness in the hydrocarbon and precious-metals trade, intensifying competition with Western financial centres. Russian businesspeople and high-net-worth individuals have also found an attractive refuge there: a mere real-estate investment now grants permanent residency, making it easier for Russians to navigate global sanctions. The UAE’s proactive policymaking means that, unlike traditional players like Switzerland, it can swiftly adjust its economic levers and engage in geopolitics to capture international capital flows.
In 2023, Switzerland hoped to play a major role in resolving political tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Yet it was ultimately China, with discreet support from another Gulf state, the Sultanate of Oman, that reconciled the two rivals. Likewise, in 2022, while the conflict between Ukraine and Russia commanded global attention, Switzerland found itself sidelined: Kyiv and Moscow preferred Turkiye’s mediation, a country seen as more credible intermediaries than the European Union or Switzerland.
Saudi Arabia, for its part, has demonstrated active and sometimes surprising diplomacy. In 2024 and 2025, it served as a key interlocutor between the United States and Russia, attempting to defuse tensions over crucial dossiers, and also became involved in negotiations between Ukraine and Russia. Additionally, Riyadh organised a peace summit for Sudan and is preparing, in June 2025, to host an international conference on peace in Gaza and to build support for the establishment of a Palestinian state. This diplomatic offensive aims to cultivate the image of Saudi Arabia as a power capable of driving concrete solutions–and more importantly, becoming a power broker in their own right.
Oman continues its long-standing mediation efforts, notably on the Iranian nuclear issue, where it acts as a trusted intermediary between Tehran and Washington. Qatar, meanwhile, has established itself as one of the most versatile actors: it facilitated talks between the Taliban and the United States, coordinated meetings between Ukraine and Russia, played a central role in negotiations between Israel and Hamas, and even helped ease tensions between Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo.
On the front of economic diplomacy, competition is also intensifying. Switzerland hosts the World Economic Forum (WEF) in Davos (more commonly known as the Davos Forum), where each year some 2,000 select decision-makers convene to debate major global issues, forge connections and seal deals. However, since 2017, Saudi Arabia has been organising its own forum in Riyadh called the “Future Investment Initiative” (FII), although more commonly dubbed, and contested by the WEF, “the Davos of the Desert.” The FII brings together over 7,000 participants from East and West and has established itself as an alternative platform for economic diplomacy. To ensure the success of the FII, Saudi Arabia recruited Richard Attias, a Moroccan businessman and former communications and organisation architect for the WEF for 14 years. Under his management, Attias has transformed the FII into the new must-attend event for heads of state, investors, and business leaders.
Saudi Arabia isn’t the only competitor. Since 2021, Qatar, in strategic partnership with Bloomberg, has also launched the Qatar Economic Forum, which brings together each year more than 1,000 political leaders, business executives and investors to discuss major economic trends, geopolitical challenges and technological innovations. The collaboration with Bloomberg has given Qatar a competitive edge in creating both distribution and exclusivity.
Through this approach, the Gulf states intend not only to remodel the architecture of international mediation but also to shift the centre of gravity of economic and diplomatic power away from Western capitals, and particularly away from Switzerland.
From Davos and Dubai: The World Order Shifts
Switzerland is asleep at the helm as it haemorrhages its economic and diplomatic influence, built up over centuries of neutrality, tradecraft, and discretion, to the Gulf states. Cities like Doha, Dubai, and Riyadh are increasingly becoming the go-to destinations for investors, businessmen, and diplomats.
For now, Switzerland remains a premier destination for services like wealth management and commodities trading, and post-war diplomatic and financial institutions maintain a strong presence in cities like Geneva, Zurich, and Bern. However, these cities, once central to the creation and maintenance of the post-war order and its institutions, risk becoming relics of the past.
Switzerland’s success was partly due to its ability to arbitrage Europe’s geopolitical centrality over the past few centuries. Both Europe and Switzerland continue to rest on their laurels as the global economy and geopolitical balance of power shift from the Atlantic to the Indo-Pacific, and are shaped by powers closer to that region.
For the first time in centuries, nations in the Middle East are influencing events in Europe, instead of the other way around. The Gulf states have proven to be strategically agile and have positioned themselves well to take advantage of this shift as havens for finance, facilitators of international trade in commodities, and intermediaries in diplomacy. Unless Switzerland takes emergency measures to reform its laws and institutions to better suit a new age, the trend will continue until countries like the Gulf states firmly claim its legacy.