Morocco Builds an Empire in West Africa
As France retreats from West Africa, Morocco fills the void through diplomacy and economic integration.
Paving The Road to Africa
On 19th February 2025, the Moroccan and Mauritanian governments announced an agreement to establish a new border crossing between their respective cities of Smara and Bir Moghrein, creating a strategic land route linking Mauritania’s mineral and hydrocarbon-rich interior to Moroccan ports on the Atlantic coast. The route is expected to improve logistics between the two countries, such as drastically reducing transport times for Mauritania’s iron ore by cutting the journey from a seven-day drive to Nouadhibou’s port down to just three days via the Bir Moghrein-Smara crossing to Morocco’s Laayoune port.
Until recently, Morocco was geographically isolated in northwest Africa, sharing land borders only with Algeria to the east and the vast, mostly ungoverned Sahara to the south. Persistent tensions with Algeria have led to repeated border closures, leaving Morocco with just one overland connection to the rest of Africa: south through the disputed Western Sahara region via Mauritania. Morocco considers Western Sahara an integral part of its territory and has administered most of the region since Spain’s withdrawal from its former colony in 1975.
The Polisario Front, an insurgent group claiming to represent the Sahrawi people native to Western Sahara, have long sought independence, and since 1975, Polisario has waged an intermittent war against Morocco, allegedly with varying degrees of military, financial, and diplomatic support from Algeria, Libya, Cuba, and Iran. International monitors estimate that this multi-decade war has resulted in 10,000-to-20,000 casualties among combatants and civilians.
As part of its counterinsurgency efforts, Morocco has constructed the Berm, a 2,700-kilometre-long "sand wall" manned by 100,000 soldiers stationed in a series of military outposts. This defensive line stretches from the Algerian border to the Atlantic, effectively serving as Morocco’s de facto southern boundary. The Berm creates a slight separation between Mauritania and Western Sahara (and thus Morocco), leaving a stretch of largely uninhabited territory known as No Man’s Land. Due to extensive minefields and the absence of permanent settlements, this area has historically prevented direct border access between Morocco and Mauritania.
This is changing. The Guerguerat border post, once a remote checkpoint between Mauritania and Morocco separated by No Man’s Land, is now being transformed into a fully operational international crossing with the necessary infrastructure. It has become a crucial node in Morocco’s trade network with sub-Saharan Africa, facilitating over $1 billion in annual exports, roughly 2% of Morocco’s total exports, primarily agricultural and industrial goods.
The Guerguerat and Smara-Bir Moghrein crossings represent more than logistical improvements. By establishing direct corridors with Mauritania and its resource-rich interior, abundant in iron, copper, and oil, to Moroccan Atlantic ports like Laayoune, this infrastructure will further integrate Mauritania into Morocco’s export-driven economy and enable access to the rest of Africa to participate in this expanding economic zone. Given Morocco’s industrial ambitions, which demand substantial natural resources, this development marks a new phase in Rabat’s long-term geopolitical strategy to position itself as Africa’s primary economic gateway to the Atlantic, Europe, and beyond.
In doing so, Morocco hopes to establish itself as a regional hegemon that can outmanoeuvre its historical rival, Algeria, and replace waning French influence in West Africa. But Morocco faces stiff competition. As France’s influence wanes amid diplomatic setbacks, and Russia’s engagements in Mali and elsewhere face growing scrutiny over war crimes and other abuses, a power vacuum has emerged across West Africa.
New actors, including Turkiye, Iran, China, and the Gulf Arab States, are vying to fill the void. Even so, Morocco stands out as the most geographically proximate, politically stable, and economically coherent contender, with a thousand-year history of cultural and imperial dominance covering much of the region. Unlike external powers, Morocco is playing a long game, one it has been preparing for over two decades under King Mohammed VI (MVI), who ascended the Moroccan throne in 1999.
The Makhzen: Morocco’s Tradition of State
Morocco’s ties in the region are rooted in its millennia-old role as a bridge for peoples, goods, and ideas travelling between West Africa, the Mediterranean, and the Middle East. For centuries, Berber traders and caravans operated as the lifeblood of trans-Saharan commerce, linking Moroccan cities like Sijilmasa and Marrakesh to West African hubs such as Timbuktu and Gao. Moroccan merchants exchanged textiles, ceramics, and weapons for gold, ivory, and salt, a trade that enriched Moroccan dynasties and financed monumental projects like the grand mosques of Fez and Meknes.
Trade also facilitated cultural and religious exchange. The spread of Islam across North Africa in the 7th and 8th centuries fostered permanent political, cultural, and commercial bonds that laid the groundwork for Morocco’s imperial identity. Scholars from Timbuktu travelled to Moroccan centres of learning like Al-Qarawiyin University in Fez, while Sufi orders such as the Tijaniyya and Qadiriyya spread southward, embedding Moroccan interpretations of Islam into West African societies. To this day, Morocco retains cultural and religious soft power in the region, with the Maliki school of Islamic jurisprudence, dominant in Morocco, remaining the primary madhhab across much of West Africa. Morocco also finances the construction and maintenance of mosques in countries like Senegal, Mali, and Niger, while training imams from these nations in Moroccan religious institutions.
All of this was facilitated by political powers centred in modern-day Morocco, which for centuries has been referred to, across various dynasties and forms, as the Makhzen, derived from the Arab word for ‘cabinet’ or ‘storehouse’. Indeed, Morocco is one of the few political entities in North and West Africa with a centuries-old tradition of state. The Idrisi dynasty, founded by Idris I in 757, unified Berber tribes and Arab settlers and institutionalised Morocco’s role as a regional power, a legacy later expanded by the Almoravids (11th–12th centuries), who extended Moroccan influence southward into West Africa and as far as the Ghana Empire. By the 16th century, the Sa’adi dynasty projected Moroccan power even farther, launching a military campaign in 1591 that toppled the Songhai Empire, then the dominant force in West Africa. The Sa’adi conquest of Timbuktu and Gao transformed these cities into Moroccan-administered pashaliks (provinces), securing control over trans-Saharan trade routes.
The current ‘Alawi dynasty, which has ruled Morocco since 1631, inherited this imperial mantle. Under Sultan Moulay Ismail (1672–1727), Morocco’s influence extended deep into the Sahara, with claims reaching as far south as Saint-Louis in present-day Senegal. These historical claims were later revived by Morocco’s nationalist Istiqlal movement in the mid-20th century, which rejected the legitimacy of Mauritania’s borders as a “colonial artifice” designed to fracture Morocco’s natural hinterland. Even after formal recognition of Mauritanian sovereignty in 1973, Morocco’s geopolitical imagination has never fully relinquished its vision of a sphere of influence stretching into West Africa.
Following independence from France in 1956, Morocco’s foreign policy initially pivoted toward pan-Arabism and “subaltern” solidarity, sidelining its historical ties to sub-Saharan Africa. This shift was exacerbated by the Western Sahara conflict, which isolated Morocco diplomatically after much of Africa recognised the Polisario Front’s Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR). Morocco’s withdrawal from the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in 1984, in protest against the SADR’s admission, marked a low point in its African engagement.
This position changed under King MVI as Morocco repositioned itself as an “inheritor state” of the country’s various imperial dynasties, drawing legitimacy from its deep institutional continuity and historical influence over the Sahara and Sahel regions of West Africa. Morocco returned to the African Union in 2017, and has sought membership in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), lobbied for infrastructure investments like the Casablanca-Dakar highway, and positioned itself as a mediator in regional crises, from the 2012 Mali conflict to migration governance. These efforts reflect a long-term vision to revive Morocco’s historical role as a gateway between Africa and Europe, leveraging its political stability, banking sector, and industrial base to attract West African partners.
Outsourcing the Françafrique
Morocco’s economic and diplomatic expansion into West Africa is not rivalrous towards France, but instead part of a process of France “outsourcing” the management of its Françafrique sphere of influence to Morocco. France’s attempt to maintain the post-colonial status quo in the region has resulted in diminishing returns over time, and Morocco has positioned itself to take advantage of the moment when France could no longer maintain that status quo and sought new partners to take over this process.
Since ascending to the throne in 1999, MVI has systematically cultivated Morocco’s ties with West African nations through a combination of high-level diplomacy and strategic economic investments that would eventually position Morocco to replace French influence in West Africa. His frequent visits to Senegal, Mali, Guinea, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Côte d’Ivoire have yielded numerous cooperation agreements spanning trade, security, and infrastructure development. These partnerships form the backbone of Morocco’s ambitious vision to position itself as the primary economic and logistical conduit between Africa and Europe.
At the heart of this strategy lies the Al Mada investment fund, the royal family’s financial arm that functions as Morocco’s de facto sovereign wealth fund. Through Al Mada, Moroccan businesses have aggressively expanded into West African markets, particularly in banking, insurance, telecommunications, and construction, seeking to replace French influence across the region.
Leading Moroccan financial institutions such as Attijariwafa Bank and BMCE Bank have established a robust presence in West Africa, a trend accelerated by the withdrawal of French institutions like Société Générale. Attijariwafa, Morocco’s largest financial entity, is poised to acquire Société Générale subsidiaries in Mauritania, Togo, and Benin. This expansion not only challenges France’s historical economic dominance but also reflects Morocco’s broader ambition to become the continent’s financial gateway.
Similarly, in telecommunications, Morocco’s Itissalat Al-Maghrib (Maroc Telecom) operates in 11 countries, primarily in West Africa, managing subsidiaries such as Mauritel in Mauritania, Onatel in Burkina Faso, and Sotelma in Mali. Alongside France’s Orange, Morocco’s Maroc Telecom is a rising star that ranks among Africa’s largest telecom operators.
Morocco is also advancing its technological ambitions through the Panafsat initiative, a satellite constellation project designed to provide internet access to 26 African countries, directly competing with Elon Musk’s Starlink. The country is capitalising on shifting regional dynamics, particularly as French firms reduce their footprint. Moroccan companies like Marsa Maroc, the operator of Tanger-Med (the world’s 17th-largest port), have stepped in to manage logistics infrastructure in Liberia and Benin following Bolloré Logistics’ exit.
Morocco’s southern provinces of Dakhla and Laayoune serve as critical nodes in the kingdom’s regional strategy. Recognising their strategic value, King MVI launched a $7 billion infrastructure initiative in 2014 to transform these territories into logistical hubs for trans-African trade. The recent opening of the Smara-Bir Moghrein border crossing in February 2025 exemplifies this vision, creating a direct route for Mauritanian iron ore to reach Moroccan steel facilities in Laayoune. This development positions Morocco as a regional steel processing hub for the region.
Infrastructure development extends to Morocco’s Atlantic coastline, where the Dakhla Atlantic Port project promises to transform regional trade dynamics. Designed to boost fisheries, enhance trade with Africa and Brazil, and provide advanced maritime logistics, the port forms part of a broader vision for trans-African connectivity. Complementing this maritime expansion, Morocco’s 2023 Atlantic Initiative for the Sahel (AIfS) outlines ambitious plans for railway and highway networks connecting Mauritania to landlocked nations including Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Chad.
Energy development forms another pillar of Morocco’s regional strategy of integration and energy self-sufficiency. The government has set an ambitious goal to achieve 52% of domestic electricity generation via renewables by 2030. At the heart of this renewables strategy is the Noor Ouarzazate Solar Complex, the world’s largest concentrated solar power plant at 510 megawatts. Morocco is exploring the potential of uranium deposits in Western Sahara to kickstart a national (and civilian) nuclear energy programme. The kingdom has also joined the West African Power Pool through a 2024 agreement with Mauritania, enabling electricity exports to West African nations. Perhaps most ambitiously, Morocco is collaborating on the Africa-Atlantic Gas Pipeline, a $25 billion project that would transport Nigerian gas through Moroccan territory to European markets.
Cultural and academic ties further underpin Morocco’s strategy. Universities in Morocco host thousands of students from Senegal, Mali, and Côte d'Ivoire, many of whom receive scholarships to study military sciences, agriculture, and engineering. These exchanges foster lasting bilateral relationships and enable Morocco to export its expertise while cultivating long-term partnerships.
Agriculture and food security represent another pillar of Morocco’s regional engagement. The nation exports millions of dollars worth of agricultural products to West Africa, though these are frequently challenged by Mauritania’s taxation of Moroccan trucks. To circumvent this, Morocco has launched new shipping routes to Senegal, securing direct maritime access to West African markets.
Meanwhile, Morocco is bolstering its manufacturing sector with significant investments in automobile manufacturing and a $500 million pharmaceutical plant in Casablanca. This facility aims to position the country as a leading African exporter of vaccines and medications, supported by domestic research and development. Morocco’s emerging automotive industry (to be explored in more depth in a future Vizier report) is being pioneered by national automobile manufacturing startup Neo Motors, which has secured export contracts with West African nations.
Morocco Faces Stiff Geopolitical Competition
France’s historical influence in West Africa dramatically declined, with a broad military retreat occurring across the region as military juntas take over Sahel nations one by one. This has opened up opportunities for Morocco, once colonised by France along with the rest of Africa, to fill the void. However, Morocco is not the sole actor vying for influence in West Africa. Regional neighbours such as Algeria and international powers, including Russia, Turkiye, China, and the UAE, have similarly intensified their presence, each advancing distinct strategic agendas.
Guided by a decades-old Soviet-era ‘Africa policy’ and President Vladimir Putin’s ambition, Russia has capitalised on rising anti-Western (particularly anti-French) sentiment in West Africa to become the foremost military power in the region. Through support for military juntas, including those of Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Chad (as well as seeking to expand their footprint in eastern Libya and Sudan), and fourth-generation warfare tactics such as disinformation campaigns and propaganda, Russia has significantly eroded French influence. However, Russia too has seen its soft power in the region take significant blows, not least because of the actions of paramilitary organisations like the Wagner Group, which has operated in Mali as an extension of the Kremlin. Under the pretext of security contracts, the group has also engaged in the illegal extraction of gold reserves and stands accused of numerous human rights violations and massacres against civilians.
Algeria, historically aligned with Russia and something of an archnemesis to Morocco, has conducted joint military exercises with the Russians near Morocco’s border. However, since the Ukraine conflict began, Algeria has cautiously distanced itself from Moscow, citing Russia’s diminished arms export capacity and its reluctance to commit to overt military alliances. Nonetheless, both nations continued to support Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria until its collapse in December 2024. Algeria also defied the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) by acquiring Russian-made Su-57 fighter jets, prompting US Senator Marco Rubio to propose sanctions in 2022.
Algeria, for its part, has long relied on proxy warfare to extend its influence, backing separatist movements such as the Polisario Front in Morocco and the Azawad Front in Mali. Leaked diplomatic cables suggest that after the 2012 Tamanrasset terrorist attack, Algerian authorities struck tacit agreements with AQIM, redirecting threats towards Moroccan and French interests in exchange for sparing Algerian assets. This alleged cooperation has reportedly led to the deaths of at least three Moroccan nationals in Mali over the past decade.
Iran’s role in West Africa, though understated, is multifaceted and expanding. Since the 1990s, Tehran has promoted Shia proselytisation in a region historically dominated by Sufi Islam. Nigeria now hosts a larger Shia population than Lebanon, with groups like the Islamic Movement, modelled on Iran’s revolutionary system, advocating for a Shia Islamic republic. Iran and Hezbollah have also allegedly supported the Polisario Front since 2018, supplying training and short-range missiles to fighters in Tindouf. Reports even suggest Polisario troops participated in Syria’s civil war alongside Iranian-backed militias.
China’s involvement, by contrast, is primarily economic. Through its Belt and Road Initiative, Beijing focuses on securing raw materials and funding infrastructure, such as Mauritania’s Nouakchott deep-water port and Guinea’s Djibloho Dam, while establishing logistics networks for mineral extraction.
Turkiye has also grown assertive, selling drones to Mali, including the model downed by Algeria, and backing Libya’s Tripoli-based government. Ankara’s plans to open military bases in southern Libya, near Algeria’s border, signal a deepening engagement across Africa.
The UAE has likewise emerged as a pivotal player, cultivating ties with the Sahel military juntas, facilitating Mali’s gold exports, and processing Guinea’s bauxite into aluminium in Emirati facilities. It maintains naval access agreements with Mauritania and robust investment links with Morocco, though relations with Algeria remain strained due to competing regional ambitions.
Morocco enjoys the advantage of an understanding with France to replace its influence in the region, but faces mounting challenges to its drive for regional hegemony. The UAE’s and Turkiye’s expanding military footprints through bases and arms deals risk diluting Morocco’s regional leverage.
Challenges to Morocco’s Rise
Morocco’s foreign policy in West Africa has been enabled by the vacuum created by France’s retreat from the region, and a tacit agreement between to two states for a ‘transfer’ of power. Under the rule of King MVI, Morocco has assiduously cultivated diplomatic, cultural, and economic influence across Africa for the past few decades. This has laid the foundations of an economic empire that can funnel raw resources from across Africa to Moroccan factories for further value-added production, which can then be exported to nations around the world.
However, Morocco faces numerous challenges in doing so. Terrorism is on the rise across the Sahel as the French military retreat, Russian paramilitary war crimes, and weak state capacity have allowed groups like Al-Qaeda to occupy territory. Powers further afield like Russia, China, Turkiye, the UAE, and Iran are also seeking to take advantage of the state of chaos across Africa.
Perhaps most importantly, ordinary citizens in Morocco are not reaping the rewards as the country suffers from high and persistent unemployment and low wages. The Makzhen, Morocco’s political and economic elite, and particularly the royal family through the Al Mada fund, reap the lion’s share of rewards through the acquisition of French assets and new business links across Africa. As King MVI looks across West Africa and sees an opportunity to restore Morocco’s historical position of primacy in the region, he may yet be forced to contend with issues closer to home, like fixing Morocco’s political economy.
Exploring these issues in detail—and their potential solutions—will be an ongoing theme at Vizier, covering Morocco’s proactive strategy to industrialise at home and develop greater diplomatic and economic influence abroad.