Why is Russia back in Damascus?
The west uses sanctions as leverage against Syria, whose government looks to Russia as a counter
Damascus Uses Russia as Leverage
Damascus is cautiously establishing limited ties with Russia. Their objective is not full normalisation with Russia but acquiring leverage in Syria’s interests, primarily in relation to sanctions removal by the U.S. and E.U. (who have partly conditioned this on the expulsion of Russia from Syria), the return of Bashar Al-Assad from Moscow to stand trial in Damascus, and the transfer of material assets and resources belonging to Syria that Russia may still control.
This has caused consternation among many Syrians, but Damascus has no intention of “papering over” Russia’s support for the Assad regime and its direct intervention against the revolution in 2015 turned the tide in favour of the regime. Tens of thousands were killed, hundreds of thousands expelled; with the rest of the Syrian opposition, now-President Al-Shara and Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham (“HTS” - now dissolved) also endured Russian airstrikes for a decade.
However, Syria does not have many options, and the options it does have are suboptimal. The west is stalling on sanctions removal as they hope to use sanctions as leverage to determine outcomes in Syria. The government is preparing for the bitter possibility that it may take many more months, likely several years, before sanctions are partially or fully lifted—time Syria does not have before its precarious stability is threatened by economic woes. Nor can regional states like Turkiye, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia help as without sanctions removal, support will be limited to drip-fed ‘humanitarian aid’.
Continued U.S. scepticism and the E.U.’s lack of geostrategic autonomy has put Syria in the unfortunate position of dealing with one of their butchers so that they have some sort of leverage in ongoing negotiations that does not completely strip Syria of its sovereignty and agency.
Syria’s foreign policy will require not just a regional balancing act between Turkiye and the Gulf Arab states, but an international balance between the west and Russia. Russia may be down but they are not out, and in the coming years may recover much of their geopolitical power should the Trump administration push ahead with ending the war in Ukraine on terms that currently look favourable for Russia.
This is a delicate needle to thread. Damascus has to gain what leverage it can from a relationship with Russia while ensuring it does not affect a path towards sanction relief with the west, and perhaps more crucially, avoid popular discontent among Syrians who see Russia as a key participant in the Assad regime’s brutality over the past thirteen years.
Diplomacy to Date
To this end, Russian diplomats are back in Damascus and are in direct communication with the new Syrian government.
On January 29th, first contact was officially made when a Russian delegation including deputy foreign minister Mikhail Bogdanov and Russian special envoy for Syria Alexander Lavrentyev arrived in Damascus and met with President Al-Shara, foreign minister Asad Al-Shaybani, and other members of the Syrian government.
Al-Shara was not shy in his demands, which included the return of Al-Assad and other associates that Moscow may be harbouring to stand trial in Damascus, and financial compensation from Russia for its destruction of Syrian infrastructure. Additionally, the two parties discussed economic issues like the status of wheat and oil shipments previously sent from Russia to Syria to support the Assad regime’s ailing economic situation, and the future of Russia’s bases at Hmeymim airport and Tartus naval port. The Russian delegation also requested the reopening of the Russian embassy in Damascus.
It is not unlikely that Russian oil and wheat transfers resume after their suspension with the fall of the regime, in addition to new shipments of ‘humanitarian aid’ should Damascus permit it, both because Syria needs resources which have not been forthcoming from the west, and to further leverage this relationship to benefit Syria in the interim.
On February 13th, Al-Shara was called by Russian President Vladimir Putin who congratulated him on assuming the Syrian presidency. A day later, Moscow sent a plane with 300 billion Syrian liras (roughly $20-30 million depending on the day’s exchange rate in Syria). A Russian company responsible for the printing of the Syrian currency was ordered to stop after Syria’s government came into power on December 8th, and this shipment was a batch printed before the fall of the regime.
Crucially, Russia is now also calling for sanctions to be removed on Syria, making western procrastination on sanctions removal appear increasingly reactionary. As a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, Russia has the power of veto over UNSC resolutions, including resolution 1267 which designates Al-Shara and other members of the Syrian government as internationally-designated terrorists, sanctioning them and preventing their travel (waivers have been made to enable international diplomacy). Removing resolution 1267 would hinge on getting the U.S. and Russia aligned as any vote must be unanimous among UNSC members (which further include Britain, France, and China).
Of the demands between Syria and Russia, the two most contentious are the return of Al-Assad from Moscow, and the maintenance of Russian bases in Hmeymim and Tartus—one of the main concerns of western powers. If Damascus can continue to procrastinate on the status of these bases, it will retain some leverage in negotiations on sanctions removal. Short of the west completely alienating Syria, it is unlikely that Russia will get to keep these bases. This also means that Russia is unlikely to return Al-Assad, but Syria’s primary needs are political stability and economic reconstruction.
However, should the west continue to procrastinate, there may have further repercussions than the status of Hmeymim and Tartus port. Russia has demonstrated its willingness and expertise in skirting the western sanctions regime, and should the west continue to stall on sanctions removal, there is a potential trajectory where Syria is compelled to make use of Russia’s expertise to survive. This may go beyond food, energy, and other critical resources for Syria’s economy. In the future, potential arms deals between Syria and Russia should not be ruled out as the only other state willing to equip the Syrian army is Turkiye, and Syria will likely avoid absolute reliance on the Turks and diversify its sources of equipment.
Russia is Down but Not Out
Syria’s relationship with Russia will be determined not just by domestic necessities but also by geopolitical headwinds. Syria’s liberation comes as the global post-war order is being dismantled by the Trump administration whose geopolitical priority has shifted to the American hemisphere and the Pacific to face the growing threat of China.
At the Munich Security Conference (which foreign minister Al-Shaybani also attended), Vice-President J.D. Vance and Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth all but told Europe that they are on their own as the U.S. could and would no longer guarantee European security. Symbolically, the U.S. would also decide the fate of Ukraine with Russia alone in a meeting in Saudi Arabia. Neither the E.U. or Ukraine are invited.
The Trump administration’s position on Ukraine is likely to give Russia what amounts to victory in the war. Should Russia make an amicable deal with America then Russia may be able to rebuild much of its geopolitical reach in the coming years. Russia’s inability to defend the Assad regime was a perfectly exploited window of opportunity by Syria’s revolutionary forces, but cannot form the basis of a future geopolitical strategy. Nor can Syria afford to adopt an absolutist position on Russia when no one is willing to do the same on Syria’s behalf. Russia is down but not out, and will be kept as an open option in the coming years.
If the E.U. wants to reverse its lack of geostrategic autonomy then it can start with Syria, where the E.U. has traditionally let the U.S. take the lead. If the E.U. hopes to secure some strategic victory against Russia, crippling its ability to project power into the Mediterranean and Africa through its presence in Syria would be such a victory. This would only be conceded by Damascus with the lifting – not suspension – of sanctions. Therefore holding cards like the status of Hmeymim and Tartus port is of great importance to Syria’s negotiations with the E.U.
Al-Shara and the Syrian government have demonstrated out the door their ability to conduct cold-blooded realpolitik in Syria’s interests. Russia, too, has shown pragmatism and is willing to deal with the new government regardless of their history of support to the previous Assad regime. Where Syria’s relationship with Russia will go will be determined by western attitudes towards Syria, the lifting of sanctions, and further support in getting Syria on the road to stability and prosperity.
Ahmed - would really like to hear your take on the alawite civilian massacres. Is this condoned by Jolani? If not, is he going to be able to get it under control? How will any minority fighting force turn in their weapons after this? Is Iran or Russia funding opposition?
What do you think of a potential pivot to China on the part of the new government? Do you think that’d be difficult given Turkmen/Uyghur foreign support for the new administration?