Syria Responds to Israel's Invasion with Multilateral Diplomacy
After 13 years of war, Syria attempts to avoid conflict through multilateral diplomacy with the UN, Gulf Arab states and security ties with Türkiye
On January 15th, Israel launched airstrikes in occupied Quneitra, south Syria. The strikes reportedly killed two members of Syria’s from the interior ministry’s general security forces and the civilian mayor of the town of Ghadir Al-Bustan, Abdul-Koma Abu Yasir. They were meeting for the purpose of organising the new Syrian government’s policy of disarming the civilian population to ensure no weapons lie outside the state. Israel argues it was targeting ‘armed militants near its borders.’
This is a significant escalation in Israel’s invasion which has thus far avoided direct conflict with the new authority in Damascus. In recent weeks, general security forces’ have been increasingly engaged in quiet confrontation with IDF forces going beyond the demilitarised strip and forcing them to turn back on roads. The airstrikes on January 15th that killed two general security members were likely in response to one such instance, part of an established pattern of ‘bullying’ by the IDF by what it considers to be ‘weaker foes’.
However, Syrian civilians have borne the brunt of abuses by the Israeli Defence Forces (‘IDF’). Israel has cut water and electricity to residents and demanded they evacuate their homes and villages, passed legislation to double the number of Israeli settlements in the Golan Heights, and on at least two occasions in late December shot and injured civilians protesting the IDF’s presence.
Israel’s invasion stems from security concerns over the new government in Damascus, even though Ahmad Al-Shara himself has emphasised that Syria does not seek war with Israel — and no small amount of opportunism in taking advantage of Syria’s precipitous situation to occupy more territory.
Israel’s ‘Buffer Zone for a Buffer Zone’ Strategy
Israel’s invasion began on December 8th 2024, the very day of the fall of the Assad regime. Called ‘Operation Arrow of Bashan’, this operation included Israel’s largest aerial campaign in its history with the IDF claiming it had ‘conducted over 480 airstrikes in 48 hours, 350 targeting airfields, anti-aircraft batteries, missiles, drones, fighter jets, tanks, and weapons’ production sites, and destroyed 70-80% of Syria’s strategic weapons.’ These airstrikes also targeted naval vessels in Syria’s ports in Latakia and Tartus, and supposed chemical weapons’ stockpiles belonging to the Assad regime that were supposed to have all been destroyed under international supervision in 2016. The IDF has also advertised its looting of thousands of weapons - light and heavy - to take back to Israel. This aerial campaign was accompanied by an IDF ground invasion of the demilitarisation zone between Syria and Israel established in the 1974 Agreement on Disengagement, and guarded by a UN force (‘United Nations Disengagement Observer Force - ‘UNDOF’).
This is the first time that Israel has launched a ground invasion of Syria since the 1973 Yom Kippur war. Israel’s argument is that it requires a buffer zone in addition to the buffer zone it has for the occupied Golan Heights (incidentally, also initially retained by Israel as a buffer zone). The Heights were captured by Israel in the 1967 Six-Day War and annexed in 1981, a move universally condemned under UN Resolution 497. Since then, the Heights have been internationally considered as Syrian territory except for the United States’ formal recognition of the annexation by Donald Trump in 2019. The Biden administration continued this policy, and with Trump as President once more, the American position is unlikely to change.
Israel’s invasion is a response to what it perceives as the loss of the Assad regime as a guarantor for the 1974 agreement and the general peace between Israel and Syria since then. Hafez Al-Assad, minister of defence during the 1967 war and formally responsible for the loss of the Heights, would leverage his failure to launch a military coup in 1970 and declare himself President. Three years later, the Yom Kippur war saw Hafez attempt to recover the Golan Heights (and Egypt recover the Sinai peninsula), only for the Syrian army to be defeated and the IDF advance to within thirty kilometres of Damascus and shell its suburbs. A further advance was only prevented by a UN-brokered truce under Resolution 340, followed by the 1974 agreement which created a buffer zone between the Israeli-controlled Golan Heights and Syria, covering a strip of territory centred on the city of Quneitra.
Hafez would keep the peace with Israel for the next twenty six years of his life until his death in the year 2000, when his son Bashar Al-Assad succeeded him and continued this policy. Even Syria’s entry into the ‘axis of resistance’, Iran’s patchwork of militia alliances across the Middle East, did not prompt the Assad regime to allow Iran and its allies to use the border with Israel as a launchpad for attacks. The regime would go so far as to solicit the aid of Russia in thwarting Iran’s jeopardising of Syria’s 1974 agreement with Israel. Classified documents found after the fall of the Assad regime show a backchannel used by Israel and Russia to limit escalation between the regime and Israel, allowing the latter to communicate its targeting of axis infrastructure in Syria while largely avoiding critical regime infrastructure.
Israel was caught off-guard by the collapse of the Assad regime and its guarantee of the 1974 agreement, and has decided it will take no chances and seize the opportunity it sees to convert ‘security measures’ into a more permanent occupation deeper into Syria.
Syria’s Response: Multilateral Diplomacy and Regional Alliances
Damascus has opted for the path of caution as it crafts its response to Israel’s invasion. The government recognises that it has inherited a state of total collapse and does not wish to engage in the self-destructive bravado that characterised the ‘axis of resistance’. Syria’s people are exhausted, there are security threats ranging from remnants of Assad loyalists to the PKK’s occupation of northeast Syria, the country is still not united under one state and army, and its infrastructure and economy is in ruins.
Syria has few options and must rely on its new allies and a general international consensus on the need for stability in Syria to return to the 1974 agreement with Israel. Only then can Syria hope to rebuild without fear of renewed invasion.
The first pillar of Syria’s response to Israel’s invasion has been through multilateral diplomacy. Syria has been in extensive contact with international institutions like the UN and ICC to facilitate the rehabilitation of Syria’s image which will be achieved mostly through participation in international institutions. However, the degradation of the ‘rules-based order’ and its attached institutions in recent years, particularly with the war in Gaza, means that these institutions lack any mechanism for enforcing decisions. Syria will have to rely more on states with decision-making - and enforcing - power.
Foreign minister As’ad Al-Shaybani’s tour de force in foreign policy began with outreach and visits to the Arab Gulf states, including Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE. This was a strategic, and in hindsight, wise decision as the Gulf states are key to forming a new post-Iran security architecture in the region. They are playing a key part in creating an international consensus on Syria’s sovereignty, stability, and the need to lift sanctions (important to achieving both). The Gulf states may also play an important role in providing guarantees that would mitigate Israel’s excuses for its continued occupation of Syrian territory beyond the 1974 line. Gulf lobbyists in Washington D.C. will also play a crucial role in getting Syria back on its feet and providing a channel for Syrian interests to be represented in America as the world’s leading power.
The second pillar of Syria’s response will be in developing closer security ties with Türkiye. Turkish and Syrian military officials are already in talks regarding future security cooperation in the fields of military training (including anti-air defence), organisation, and re-armament. This relationship could take a step further if the two countries establish a formal defence pact that sees Turkish air defence systems and military bases established in Syria in conjunction with the Syrian military. As one of NATO’s largest powers with an increasingly sophisticated military defence industry, Israel cannot pursue military operations to prevent a Turkish military presence in Syria itself. It is no coincidence that FM Al-Shaybani’s comments on the need for Israel to respect Syria’s borders and calls for a return to the 1974 settlement were made during the Syrian delegation’s visit to Ankara on January 16th. Türkiye is indicating its support for Syria’s territorial integrity. All this being said, it is likely that a move as large as a defence pact would also come with guarantees via backchannels between Türkiye and Israel that Syria will not become a launchpad for attacks on Israel. With Syria in its current state, that would be prudent.
Syria’s strategy is likely to pay dividends in the coming months and years. There is increasingly international consensus on the need for stability and redevelopment in the country, Syria is developing strong regional ties with allies like Saudi Arabia and Türkiye that can provide her with guarantees, and the government has demonstrated remarkable patience in the face of Israeli aggression to prevent Syria’s exhausted people being goaded into another war.
There is likely to be more provocations from Israel over the months to come but Syria has no choice but to stay the course. In time, Syria’s military and economy can be rebuilt, but only if it has the security to do so. This will depend on multilateral diplomacy and regional alliances to gain breathing room. The worst scenario is for Syria to get dragged into conflict with Israel. The Assad regime lost the Golan Heights and kept the border with Israel quiet for fifty four years. It is not the responsibility of the new government to re-open that front, especially after the regime’s war of annihilation against its own people. Now is the time for reinstating Syrian sovereignty over its territory, delivering justice, and peaceful redevelopment.