Syria's Tour De Force in Foreign Affairs
The government blitz a path towards Syrian state sovereignty, international rehabilitation, and a new regional order
Syria’s Foreign Policy Blitz Reveal Her Objectives
The new government in Damascus has led a tour de force in foreign affairs over the past two months since the fall of the Assad regime. In what may be the fastest re-establishment of sovereign relations for a post-war country in our era, the government has now had nearly three hundred meetings with various foreign delegations, including representatives of governments from around the world, trade delegations from Japan and China, international institutions including the International Criminal Court and various United Nations’ departments, civil society actors, and private sector institutions.
Every regional state (bar Israel and Iran) has established contact with or sent a delegation to Damascus. Crucially, the government is now in regular contact with U.S. diplomats with sanctions relief high on the agenda, and has established an intelligence backchannel to combat ISIS.
Beyond Damascus, a Syrian government delegation including intelligence minister Anas Khattab, defence minister Marhaf Abu Qasra, and foreign minister As’ad Hasan Al-Shaybani have toured regional capitals in recent weeks, including Riyadh, Doha, Abu Dhabi, and Ankara. Their objective has been to cement Syria’s integration into an emerging regional order in which Syria may be the linchpin, exploring issues relating to trade, security, and diplomatic rehabilitation.
A further breakthrough was achieved with Al-Shaybani’s attendance at the Davos conference in Switzerland on January 23rd, the first official trip by the new government to a European country. At Davos, Al-Shaybani was interviewed by former British Prime Minister Tony Blair, an event likely facilitated by contacts in the Gulf Arab states with whom Blair and his consultancy (the “Tony Blair Institute”) enjoy close relations. Damascus’ cultivation of its relationship with the Gulf Arab states, chief among them Saudi Arabia, has clearly reached a level where they have become comfortable in facilitating Syria’s normalisation within western decision-making circles.
In the past week, the newly-appointed President Ahmad Al-Shara has hosted Qatar’s Emir Tamim Bin Hamad Al-Thani in Damascus (the first head of state to visit Syria after Assad’s fall), and Al-Shara has visited Riyadh and Ankara on state-level visits, meeting Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman and President Erdogan, respectively. In Saudi Arabia, Al-Shara also performed the Umrah pilgrimage and was given the rare privilege of entering the Ka’aba itself (usually reserved for Muslim state leaders), a hugely symbolic moment for a man who just three months ago was confined to the trenches and tunnels of Idlib. More head-of-state diplomacy is likely on the way, including an overdue visit by President Erdogan to Damascus to pray at the Umayyad mosque.
Beyond the sheer scale of Syria’s opening to the world, the ‘council of five’ have fully demonstrated their sense of sovereign agency when it comes to acting in Syria’s interests, and have no intention of turning the country into a battleground for external interests, let alone being a client state of one regional power or another.
Syria’s foreign policy strategy demonstrates five primary objectives:
Recognising Syrian State Sovereignty: Creating a regional and international consensus on Syria’s stability and state sovereignty, and legitimising action to re-unite Syria under one authority;
Restraining Iranian and Israeli Activity: Keeping Iran and Israel out, who have been involved in or advocated for the division of Syria (e.g. through supporting autonomous or separatist movements among the Alawites, Druze, or Kurds);
Disincentivising Counter-Revolutions: Regional states like Egypt and the UAE are ideologically opposed to the new government in Damascus and have a history of sponsoring counter-revolutions in Arab states;
Creating a Regional Balance of Interests: Such as balancing Turkiye and the Arab world’s stake (principally through Saudi Arabia) in Syria’s security and economic reconstruction;
Carving a Path to Sanctions Relief: Providing a path to sanctions relief with the European Union and United States, necessary to enable aid, remittances, and investment for reconstruction.
All Roads Lead to Damascus
The speed and scale of the new government’s outreach to the world has secured de facto recognition of the legitimacy of the government in Damascus led by Al-Shara and his council. When Al-Shara was appointed as President of the transition phase last week, he received numerous calls and telegrams from regional leaders to congratulate him. This was followed by what were clearly pre-planned state visits arranged for him by the governments of Saudi Arabia and Türkiye, who are guiding Syria’s rehabilitation and recognition in the international system.
An alternative scenario may have seen states and organisations refuse to send delegations to Damascus to establish relationships with the new government, or even to send delegations of equal importance to cultivate relationships with actors opposing Damascus’ sovereignty (e.g. the “Syrian Democratic Forces” (SDF), a PKK-led entity attempting to establish a ‘state-within-a-state’ for itself in northeast Syria). While foreign governments like America, France, Germany, and the UAE continue to cultivate relationships with other actors in Syria, including the PKK and various Druze factions in south Syria, these activities have been at a smaller scale pertaining to non-sovereign issues such as humanitarian aid and civil society activity.
Western powers increasingly have little incentive in sustaining the PKK project. President Trump recently stated his desire to pull all troops out of Syria, which was quickly followed by reports that the Pentagon are drawing up withdrawal plans, and the U.S-trained and equipped ‘Free Syrian Army’ forces at Al-Tanf are reportedly preparing to take control of ISIS prisoners in the northeast once the PKK is dealt with. Crucially, a car bomb that exploded in Manbij and killed eighteen agricultural workers, all women, has led to the suspension of negotiations between Damascus and the PKK. This occurred a day before the meeting between Al-Shara and Erdogan in Ankara, with the PKK high on the agenda and rapidly approaching the conclusion of its project.
With international consensus on the imposition of Damascus’ authority over all Syrian territory against internal separatism, the government will be able to focus its efforts on external instigation. Al-Shaybani’s diplomatic strategy with the Gulf Arab states, particularly Saudi Arabia, is looking to pay off with Saudi Arabia possibly acting as Syria’s intercessor with the Trump administration. High on the agenda will be a U.S. withdrawal from northeast Syria, sanctions relief, and lobbying to put a stop to Israel’s invasion in south Syria. The government is treading firmer ground now, and both al-Shara and Al-Shaybani have secured enough regional recognition and support to increase their statements on Israel’s violation of Syrian territory in Quneitra province and demanding a return to the 1974 agreement. Syria cannot afford to be goaded into a new war with Israel and instead seeks to solve the issue through multilateral cooperation and diplomacy, a topic covered in a previous article:
Creating a New Incentives’ Architecture
One of the achievements of the government’s foreign policy strategy has been to create a new set of incentives to encourage regional and international engagement with Damascus. The government’s demonstrated keenness for re-integration into the regional and international order has compelled wary or hostile states and actors to ‘take a stake’ in Syria’s stability and reconstruction, which in turn can only happen through the lifting of sanctions and political normalisation. Through this strategy, Damascus not only mitigates hostile activity but gains supportive voices on the international stage.
If Damascus had nursed old grudges and opted for a remote if not hostile attitude and general distrust towards regional and western states, it would have incentivised long-term hostile action by neighbouring states like Egypt and the UAE and the maintenance of western sanctions that would cripple Syria's reconstruction efforts. Instead, the government chose to demonstrate that they are not ideologically hostile to regional states (even if those states remain ideologically hostile to Damascus), that Syria was not going to be a launchpad for revolution, and most importantly that the region has much more to gain from Syria’s stability and reconstruction.
The effect of this strategy was also to mitigate the immediate threat of external actors sponsoring potential counter-revolutionary activity in Syria. This threat was at its highest in the first month after the fall of the Assad regime when it was still unclear whether the new government in Damascus could successfully position itself as a legitimate actor and stabilise the country. The initial ramp-up of hostile media rhetoric among Egyptian and Emirati outlets in December, for instance, has since seen a significant decline in January. It is certain that there will continue to be distrust and agitation towards the new government in Damascus, but potentially destabilising or violent means of doing so have been heavily disincentivised by the government’s diplomacy.
Balancing Regional Interests in Syria
The most important factor in Syria’s foreign policy is in balancing the regional interests of Turkiye and the Gulf Arab states, led by Saudi Arabia, to create a new consensus that has hitherto evaded the region. This new rapprochement in Syria is in no small part due to the trauma of the Arab Spring and the rivalries created between states like Turkiye and Qatar that supported the various revolutions, and the UAE and Saudi Arabia who opposed them and helped the counter-revolutions. Turkiye and Qatar suffered diplomatic isolation, economic siege, and threats of coups and invasion for their support of the Arab Spring. Neither country wishes to carry the burden of Syria’s stability and reconstruction alone and realise the need to include Saudi Arabia.
To that end, it is notable that Saudi Arabia has been the most prominent Arab country in aiding Syria in its new foreign policy, with Qatar taking a backseat and focusing instead on development and humanitarian aid. Saudi Arabia will carry more weight not just with international powers in the EU and USA, but also with other Arab countries like the UAE and Egypt who are fearful of events in Syria. Qatar’s history with Syria and the wider Arab Spring, as well as lack of ‘pull’ with regards to other Arab states like the UAE and Egypt, may have informed Qatar’s decision to allow Saudi Arabia to take the lead on Syria.
It is also created by Damascus’ realistic assessments that in order to avoid becoming a client state of either camp, it must create a new set of incentives that bring the different regional interests together in Syria to support its stability and reconstruction. The government’s proactive foreign policy strategy has been very careful to invite Turkish-Qatari and Saudi support in lockstep.
Saudi Arabia, for its part, seeks to make up for lost time as it waited out the month of December without establishing a formal relationship with the new government in Damascus. Instead, Turkiye was the first country to establish relations with intense diplomacy in the first few weeks after the fall of the Assad regime. Intelligence minister Ibrahim Kalin visited Damascus on two occasions: December 12th and January 26th. Turkish foreign minister Hakan Fidan also travelled to Damascus on December 22nd where he met with Al-Shara and the rest of the government.
Crucially, Turkiye did not intend to monopolise the Syria agenda for itself. Turkiye simultaneously lobbied the Gulf states to establish relations with Damascus. This and Turkiye’s rapid movement prompted the Gulf’s re-appraisal of their cautious attitude, and ramped up diplomatic, economic, and humanitarian outreach to Damascus over the new year.
This started with a visit by a Gulf Cooperation Council delegation led by the Kuwaiti council chief Jasem Al-Budaiwi on December 31st. Saudi Arabia sent further delegations to Syria to coordinate humanitarian relief and established a land-and-air bridge to deliver regular aid shipments. The Syrian government responded by sending a delegation including ministers Al-Shaybani, Khattab, and Abu Qasra to Riyadh on January 2nd and Doha on January 5th. On January 12th, Saudi Arabia hosted the Riyadh Summit with attendance from the US, the EU, the UK, the Arab League, Türkiye, and Al-Shaybani representing Syria in its first international dialogue of the post-Assad era. On January 18th, the Arab League sent a delegation led by Hossam Zaki, Assistant Secretary-General, who affirmed the Arab League’s commitment to Syria’s sovereignty and that the League would apply pressure to aid in lifting sanctions on Syria. On January 24th, Saudi Arabia’s foreign minister Faisal bin Farhan visited Damascus for the first time to meet with Al-Shara, a day after Farhan’s attendance at Davos where he expressed ‘cautious optimism’ about Syria.
Al-Shara’s visit to Riyadh over the weekend and his meeting with Muhammad bin Salman was the capstone on Syria’s successful establishment of political and economic relations with Saudi Arabia, arguably now Syria’s second pillar of support after Turkiye. With proper management, the project of supporting Syria will incentivise Turkiye and Saudi Arabia to cooperate, keep more hostile states like the UAE and Egypt at bay, and provide a united front for lobbying western powers on Syria’s diplomatic rehabilitation, sanctions relief, and economic reconstruction. Out of this cooperation, the emergence of a new architecture of shared interests may emerge to bring stability to Syria and the wider region.
Defining the Contours of a New Middle East
Damascus has led a remarkable tour de force in foreign affairs and immediate threats to Syria’s stability have been mitigated. Many of Syria’s key issues now will depend on the attitude of the new Trump administration, currently a wild card factor in any country’s foreign policy. Syria’s outreach to the administration will to a large degree depend on its ability to convince Trump that Syria will not be a launchpad or harbour for terrorist groups, and this would be further reinforced by guarantees from Saudi Arabia and Turkiye.
Reaching an understanding with Trump would help in dealing with several issues, chief among them removing the PKK and restoring Damascus’ authority to northeast Syria, and providing a path to sanctions relief and the rebuilding of Syria’s economy. It is also crucial for Syria’s security to maintain US-Syrian coordination in the fight against ISIS. Additionally, sanctions relief will only be possible if the US decides to remove sanctions. The EU does not possess the geostrategic autonomy to make such decisions by itself, and instead moves in lockstep with US policy on Syria.
With Iran tending to its wound after the catastrophic defeat of its regional ambitions in Syria, the only other regional threat to the country is Israel. For now, they have scaled back their rhetoric and activities in promoting Druze and Kurdish separatism, but its forces continue to occupy areas in Quneitra province. It is still unknown whether Syria can cultivate the heft needed to convince American interlocution on the matter and a return to the 1974 agreement.
The contours of the ‘new Middle East’ have not yet been decided. Trump’s comments on the ethnic cleansing of Gaza’s population have outraged Arab and Muslim governments, with Jordan and Egypt stating this would be a declaration of war. Whatever happens in the near future, for the first time Syria will be a sovereign actor in defining these contours, and will seek to do so based on positive-sum incentives that further encourage regional integration and peace. Syria’s geostrategic location as the crossroads between Turkiye, the Gulf, Israel, and Iran will make it a linchpin of any new order. If Syria’s leaders maintain their momentum in foreign affairs, this position can be leveraged to Syria’s benefit.